

Societal and Governance Tipping Points: Improving New Zealand's Anticipatory Governance

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Introduction

Currently, humanity confronts multiple tipping points – ecological, technological and societal. In many cases, crossing these tipping points will have negative consequences; sometimes, the impacts will be serious, widespread and irreversible.¹ To mitigate such risks, but also to exploit the opportunities of positive tipping points, democratic societies need good anticipatory governance. Amongst other things, such governance is forward-looking, proactive, precautionary, prudent, participatory, and adaptive. Above all, it strives for sustainability, whether fiscal, social or environmental. It seeks, in other words, to safeguard the future such that future generations enjoy a safe prospect and the opportunity to live in a just and inclusive society. Pope Francis refers to this goal as the ‘long-term common good’; Girol Karacaoglu calls it ‘collective intergenerational wellbeing’. Whatever the label, it matters – greatly.

Fortunately, New Zealand possesses many of the institutions, political processes and policy tools necessary for good anticipatory governance. But there is much scope for improvement, especially in the fields of environmental management, social policy and technology assessment. This paper is concerned with how New Zealand can enhance the quality of its anticipatory governance in the interests of mitigating risks and seizing opportunities. In particular, it tackles two related issues.

The first concerns our collective capacity to identify and respond to various kinds of tipping points. For instance, we face various slow-motion disasters with irreversible tipping points. Climate change is the most obvious example. Equally, there are many other slow-onset or slow-burner policy problems. If these are not identified and tackled early they will impose large-scale and often long-term costs. In New Zealand such creeping problems include the spread of microscopic pests, the degradation of freshwater resources, the steady accumulation of microplastics and toxic chemicals in the environment, the loss of soil, increasing traffic congestion, the spreading obesity pandemic, declining home ownership rates, and falling rates of societal and political trust. We need political processes and institutions that properly detect, analyse, debate and mitigate such problems. But how can we realize this ambitious goal?

Second, there is the question of how to generate positive societal and governance tipping points, notably those essential to minimize future harm and mitigate serious long-term risks. For instance, how can governments achieve the required shifts in public opinion, overcome powerful vested interests, and implement cost-effective reforms? And what can citizens do when their governments are part of the problem? For instance, recent New Zealand governments have systematically failed to tackle our crucial environmental problems – high per capita greenhouse gas emissions, deteriorating freshwater quality, and biodiversity loss. Instead, policy-making has been characterized by denial, myopia, procrastination, and often ineffectual interventions. Sadly, much governmental thinking is backward-looking, and often

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based on flawed assumptions, questionable ethical norms, and short-sighted priorities. Crucially, it fails to take biophysical limits seriously and gives inadequate weight to long-term interests. We need a paradigm shift in the form of an ecological reformation. But how can this shift be realized?

In what follows, I briefly outline the concept of anticipatory governance, discuss the idea of societal and governance tipping points, and explore the relationship between tipping points and anticipatory governance. I then propose a series of policy and institutional reforms designed to enhance the quality of anticipatory governance in New Zealand, and thereby better safeguard the interests of our future selves and those of future generations.

Anticipatory governance

Governance, at least in a public or political context, refers to the full range of institutions, structures, processes, decision-rules and criteria necessary for governing or steering a society. Good democratic governance has many important attributes. It values human dignity, protects liberty, pursues justice, and honours the truth. Equally, it seeks to protect the long-term public interest by identifying, assessing, mitigating and managing risks, confronting current and looming policy problems, enhancing a society's overall resilience, and adopting policies that are prudent and sustainable. In short, good governance is anticipatory. While there is no agreed definition of anticipatory governance and no universally accepted list of characteristics, the following attributes are often mentioned in the relevant academic literature (see Boston, 2016, 2017a, 2017b; Fuerth and Faber, 2012, 2013; Guston, 2014; Quay, 2010).

To start with, anticipatory governance takes uncertainty seriously, including deep uncertainty.² It recognizes that policy-makers face many surprises or 'black swan' events. Similarly, it acknowledges that the past may provide little guidance to the future; that recent trends may not continue; and that gradual changes may be punctuated by non-linear or abrupt changes. In other words, it recognizes that apparently stable states can be flipped to different and possible unstable states if particular tipping points are crossed (see Walker, 2014). Accordingly, the practitioners of anticipatory governance do not yearn for false certainties, but embrace the need, given a dynamic and uncertain world, for anticipatory planning, adaptive management and regular, incremental policy adjustments.

Anticipatory governance is also forward-looking: it encourages foresight and takes a long view. It regularly scans the horizon for warning signals as well as new and unexpected opportunities. It considers risks, including the potential for disruptive tipping points, over extended timeframes and seeks the capability and tools to manage, and where possible, mitigate such risks. It explores a range of future scenarios and conducts regular 'stress-tests' to ascertain the robustness of current institutional, policy, and regulatory settings.

Necessarily, therefore, anticipatory governance is proactive rather than reactive. It values vigilance, preparedness, precaution, and wise stewardship. It favours prevention over cure. It celebrates good evidence, creativity, innovation, and imagination. Likewise, it endorses a broad, holistic view of a society's performance: it focuses not only on fiscal deficits, but also on social, ecological, and democratic deficits. Equally, it takes seriously the threat posed by deficits in adaptive capacity, all the more so given the current rapid and extraordinary technological advances associated with the fourth industrial revolution (such as advanced robotics and artificial intelligence) and unprecedented environmental changes.

Given these contextual considerations, the practitioners of anticipatory governance endeavour to build resilient, yet flexible and nimble, democratic institutions and processes, ones that are alert to the dangers of path dependence, cognitive biases, vested interests, and political myopia. Such institutions and

² Deep uncertainty refers to situations where decision-makers are unable to agree on: a) the relationships between the variables in a system; b) the relevant probability distributions; and c) the desirability of different outcomes.

processes seek to expose citizens to the best available scientific evidence, confront the hard, unavoidable policy trade-offs, encourage respectful deliberation and reasoned debate, nurture shared values and a common vision, and pursue broad agreement on how best to respond to the nation's major long-term challenges. Necessarily, this entails governmental openness, transparency and active citizen engagement. It thus values participative and deliberative modes of decision-making, ones that take expertise and evidence seriously and exhibit reciprocity, respect and reflection (Curato, et al., 2017).

I realize that these attributes of anticipatory governance may sound idealistic, if not utopian. But such attributes are surely amongst the relevant standards against which the quality of democratic governance should be assessed. A crucial question, of course, is how political systems in advanced democracies can be shifted towards the anticipatory end of the spectrum.

In New Zealand's case, such a shift is much needed. Admittedly, our policy institutions and instruments in some areas, like fiscal and monetary policy, are relatively forward-looking, precautionary and proactive. But in many areas of social and environmental policy they are deficient (Boston, 2016, 2017b). From an anticipatory governance perspective, the weaknesses include:

- inadequate monitoring and reporting frameworks;
- weak foresight institutions – both in the executive and legislative branches;
- a lack of regular systematic analyses of creeping problems, especially those with irreversible tipping points;
- limited assessment of the impact of new technologies (e.g. those at the heart of the fourth industrial revolution);
- a lack of effective, pro-active policy tools, particularly in the area of resource management and spatial planning;
- a failure to internalize significant environmental externalities;
- a lack of comprehensive and effective strategies to address crucial long-term problems, such as climate change mitigation and adaptation, a lack of legislative commitment devices requiring governments to produce such strategies, and a failure to take the Sustainable Development Goals seriously;
- flawed policy paradigms and mindsets – especially a failure to take biophysical limits seriously and to value ecosystem services properly; and
- reticent and reactive political leadership.

As a result, New Zealand faces many disturbing social and environmental trends and often poor policy outcomes. I will return shortly to the question of how we might address their deficiencies.

Tipping points and creeping problems

The concept of tipping points has gained wide currency across multiple disciplines in recent decades. There are various definitions on offer. According to Malcolm Gladwell (2000), for instance, 'Tipping points are commonly defined as moments in time where a normally stable or only gradually changing phenomenon suddenly takes a radical turn'. Tipping points, in other words, involve significant and rapid transitions from one state of affairs or one kind of equilibrium to another state of affairs. Such transitions are not only relatively abrupt; they are often disruptive, even catastrophic. Once a disruption has occurred it may continue for an extended period before a new and more stable state of affairs – or equilibrium – is reached.

In terms of societal and governance tipping points, there are various types. Four closely related types immediately spring to mind. In each case they can differ greatly in their scope, scale and overall impacts.

First, there can be rapid shifts in public opinion and electoral preferences, as for instance occurred during the recent electoral campaigns in Britain and France. Second, there may be rapid shifts in

business confidence and economic activity, as was evident during 2008 and early 2009 during the global financial crisis. Third, there can be major shifts in public policy, perhaps simultaneously across multiple policy domains, as witnessed in New Zealand in the mid-to-late 1980s and again in the early 1990s. Finally, there are tipping points which affect the system of democratic governance itself. Such tipping points may give rise to significant changes in electoral arrangements, major modifications to the allocation of public power between different political institutions or levels of governance, or complete regime changes – such as the collapse and overthrow of democratic processes or the creation of new states. Examples of such governance tipping points include electoral reform in New Zealand in the early-to-mid 1990s, the devolution of major governance responsibilities to sub-national government, as occurred in Britain in the late 1990s with the creation of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, and political coups, such as those in Fiji in recent decades.

The four types of societal and governance tipping points I have outlined are often closely related. Significant shifts in public attitudes may well spark demands for policy reform, and a failure to satisfy such demands may contribute to pressures for regime change. Similarly, a major financial or economic shock is likely to have substantial electoral and policy implications.

There is a vast academic literature on different kinds of societal and governance tipping points, and their causes and consequences. Examples include studies of political revolutions, civil wars, regional and global conflicts, major technological revolutions and medical advances, financial crises and depressions, radical policy shifts, and major changes in societal attitudes. There is not the space to explore this literature here. But various points need highlighting.

First, most changes in societal and governance arrangements, certainly in advanced democracies like New Zealand, occur gradually and incrementally rather than abruptly or dramatically. Major tipping points are periodic or intermittent. In many contexts they are comparatively rare. Societal and governance systems, in other words, can remain relatively stable for long periods of time. They tend to be sluggish and often resistant to change. They can get stuck in ‘traps’ that are hard to break out of.

Second, societal and governance tipping points typically involve triggers or prompts. These are variously called ‘triggering events’ (Wood, 2006) ‘focussing events’, and ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Hogan and Doyle, 2007; Pierson, 2003). There is also the related notion of ‘punctuated equilibria’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). Such triggers are often dramatic and highly visible events which in turn can precipitate crises. Such ‘shocks’ may be endogenous or exogenous, and can result from either human actions, such as terrorist attacks, or natural processes, such as major climatic or seismic events. Either way, these events contribute to instability and provide a new momentum for system-wide changes. In particular, they create windows of opportunity or political space for policy innovation or radical institutional change (Pelling and Dill, 2010).

Third, it is usually hard to predict in advance what particular event or convergence of processes will serve as the relevant trigger point or critical juncture (Moser and Dilling, 2007). Sometimes it might be a relatively minor event or perhaps a series of events which fortuitously attract widespread attention; a snowballing process may then take effect. Social media now provides an additional mechanism for rapid snowballing and mass engagement.

Note that there is an interesting and growing literature on ways to predict tipping points in complex dynamical systems, whether climate systems or financial systems (Scheffer, et al., 2009). For instance, there appear to be certain generic symptoms, bifurcations or early warning signals that occur in many complex systems as they approach a critical point or an impending transition. Such symptoms include: flickering; self-organized patterns; increased auto-correction; and increased variance of fluctuation (ibid.). Nevertheless, detection of these patterns is often challenging, not least because of false positives

and false negatives.³ Hence, the capacity to model and accurately predict key thresholds remains limited.

Fourth, once a societal or governance tipping point has been reached there will typically be a period of political uncertainty in which a range of different options for policy or institutional change are feasible, at least initially. Which particular option ultimately prevails and becomes embedded may take months or years to determine. Consider, for instance, the Brexit process currently underway in Europe: there are many plausible scenarios, including the eventual abandonment of the current exit negotiations.

Fifth, societal and governance tipping points can be both positive and negative, and invariably there are both winners and losers. Some tipping points can shift a society to a better state of affairs, as assessed by various performance measures; others can have the reverse effect. Globally, the current huge investment in new plant and equipment for the manufacture of electric vehicles is an example of a positive transition. We may not have reached a decisive tipping point yet in the relative price of electric and non-electric vehicles, but it cannot be far away. And it is highly likely that we will see a massive switch in consumer demand towards electric vehicles over the next five years.

Anticipatory governance and tipping points

In relation to tipping points, anticipatory governance is highly relevant for at least three reasons. First, policy-makers who seek to govern with an anticipatory mindset will be alert to the risk of abrupt or non-linear changes – whether ecological, societal or technological – and thus better equipped to manage the inevitable economic, social and political adjustment processes. Second, and related to this, they will take creeping policy problems seriously, especially those with likely damaging tipping points, and seek to address such problems early. Indeed, as noted earlier, a core objective of sound anticipatory governance is to minimize avoidable, disruptive and harmful tipping points. Third, policy-makers will be mindful that democratic societies often resist prudent and desirable policy changes, not least because such changes are politically inconvenient: they may impose significant near-term costs on many citizens and/or threaten powerful vested interests. A key goal of good anticipatory governance, therefore, must be to design governance arrangements, political strategies and institutions that can help encourage and facilitate desirable policy tipping points.

A reform agenda – ways to enhance sound anticipatory governance

Returning to the two questions posed at the outset – first, how to enhance our collective capacity to identify and respond to various kinds of tipping points, including slow-motion disasters and other creeping problems with irreversible tipping points; and second, how to enhance our collective capacity to generate desirable societal and governance tipping points. As noted earlier, these questions are related: the first is about avoiding *negative* tipping points; the second is about cultivating *positive* tipping points. Both tasks are critical. But both are also hard. There are no simple answers.

Regarding the first question, I have proposed a series of institutional reforms in several recent publications (Boston, 2016, 2017a, 2017b). I cannot discuss these in detail here, but their broad aim is to enhance the anticipatory capacity of our democratic political system through better early warning systems, better analytical and foresight capabilities, stronger political incentives (e.g. via additional commitment devices) to tackle creeping policy problems, a wider range of proactive policy tools, and measures to embed long-term interests more effectively within day-to-day policy-making processes and decision-rules.

³ False positives are situations where the results of a test wrongly suggest that a specific attribute or condition is present, whereas false negatives refer to situations where a test wrongly indicates that a specific attribute or condition is not present.

As to specific proposals, let me mention five:

1. The establishment of a Parliamentary Select Committee dedicated to future-oriented policy issues along the lines of the Finnish Parliament's Committee for the Future;
2. The creation of a dedicated foresight unit in a central agency, such as the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet;
3. The establishment of new institutions to facilitate and encourage climate change mitigation and adaptation, ideally modelled on the British Climate Change Act (2008), as advocated in late July by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (2017);
4. The enactment of additional commitment devices in legislation that require governments to give more attention to long-term policy problems. Such devices could include a Long-Term Reporting Act under which governments must: a) publish periodic intergenerational reports; b) give explicit consideration to principles of intergenerational justice in their decision-making processes; and c) report regularly on their progress towards meeting long-term policy targets, such as those embodied in the Sustainable Development Goals; and
5. The implementation of new policy instruments to facilitate proactive planning at multiple levels of government. For instance, there is a strong case for establishing a new funding mechanism to help cover the costs of climate change adaptation, especially the costs of managed retreat in the face of sea level rise (Boston and Lawrence, 2017).

Such reforms are by no means complete solutions. Identifying and predicting tipping points is bound to remain challenging, not least because of deep uncertainty and complexity. Equally, fundamental political constraints cannot be willed away. Nevertheless, improvement is possible, and we should seek to learn from other advanced democracies as they tackle common problems.

Generating societal and governance tipping points

The second question concerns the challenge of bringing about societal and governance tipping points. On the one hand, there is the issue of how governments can achieve durable policy transformations in order to safeguard future interests. On the other hand, there is the problem of what citizens can do when their governments are part of the problem.

There is a vast literature on *theories of change* – whether changes in societal attitudes and values, public policy or political regimes. The nature and causes of all the big cultural, social, economic and political transformations since the Middle Ages have been much studied – notably, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the emergence of nation states, the abolition of slavery, the industrial revolution, the rise of democratic modes of governance, the establishment of welfare states, the quest for gender equality and indigenous rights, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the parallel ascendancy of neoliberalism. Likewise, there have been detailed studies of policy tipping points and their various drivers and triggers. In New Zealand this includes the Social Security Act 1938, the protection afforded to Lake Manapouri in the early 1970s, the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s, the move to a nuclear-free status in 1985, and the policy moves in the 1980s to address the unjust and abhorrent treatment of Māori in the 19th century. It is not possible here to review such cases and the many different theories of change. A few brief comments must thus suffice.

First, in all complex systems, such as democratic political systems, there are numerous leverage points (Meadows, 2010; Costanza, 2014). Basically, these constitute points of power; they are locations in a system where small changes can lead to large behavioural shifts and alter outcomes. Several decades ago, the pioneering environmentalist and systems analyst Donella Meadows identified 12 such leverage points. These are outlined in Table 1.

In Meadows' framework the leverage points are ranked according to their likely influence. At the least influential end of the spectrum, she lists 'numbers', 'buffers' and 'stock and flow structures'. 'Numbers', in the context of a political system, include such things as taxes, subsidies and regulatory

standards. At the most influential end of the spectrum, she lists transcending paradigms and paradigms. The latter constitute the mindsets or worldviews which determine the goals, structures, rules and parameters of a system. They embody a society's basic moral norms, shared ideals, deepest beliefs, unstated assumptions, and views about the nature of reality. Changing our paradigms, according to Meadows, is a critical leverage point. This is because ideas matter. They affect what we value and how we behave. Hence, they profoundly influence such things as our intertemporal preferences and policy priorities.

Table 1: Leverage points – places to intervene in a system, ranging from most to least influential

	Leverage point – category	Explanation
1	Transcending paradigms	Recognition that all paradigms are partially flawed and subject to displacement
2	Paradigms	The mindsets from which the goals, structures, rules, delays and parameters of a system arise
3	Goals	The purpose or function of a system
4	Self-organization	The power to add, change or evolve a system's structure
5	Rules	Incentives, sanctions and constraints
6	Information flows	The rules and structures governing access to information
7	Reinforcing feedback loops	The strength of the gain of driving loops
8	Balancing feedback loops	The strength of the feedbacks relative to the impacts they are trying to correct
9	Delays	The length of time relative to the rates of system change
10	Stock and flow structures	Physical systems and their nodes of intersection
11	Buffers	The sizes of stabilizing stocks relative to their flows
12	Numbers	Constants and parameters such as subsidies, taxes and regulatory standards

Source: Meadows, 2010. Adapted.

There are good reasons to question how Meadows categorizes and ranks the intervention points in complex social systems. Be that as it may, three observations are worth underscoring. First, there are multiple ways to achieve a significant change in society – such as generating a tipping point in major policy frameworks or governance arrangements. Reformers are not limited to a single approach, methodology or intervention point.

Second, it makes sense to engage multiple leverage points, adjusting the overall strategy and mix of interventions to reflect the specific social, economic and political context and how this evolves over time. Windows of opportunity, perhaps generated by exogenous shocks, are bound to arise, and adept reformers can exploit these to advance their cause.

Third, unquestionably, as Meadows and others have argued, paradigms matter. Humanity's destruction and degradation of environmental goods over recent centuries reflects a particular philosophical paradigm. Amongst other things, this paradigm:

1. places little value on biodiversity or the intrinsic worth of individual species and unique landscapes;
2. denies or underestimates the importance of biophysical constraints;
3. assumes that there are technological fixes to every environmental problem;
4. acclaims the wisdom and power of markets;
5. extols the virtue of private property rights at the expense of the long-term public interest;
6. questions the efficacy of governmental interventions, the legitimacy of state regulation, and the desirability of planning;
7. values performance measures based on resource flows over those based on capital stocks, and values certain flow measures like GDP over other flow measures (such as those associated with ecosystem services);

8. prioritizes financial and manufactured capital over natural and social capital; and
9. endorses unjustifiably high discount rates.

If environmental goods are to be properly protected on a durable basis, a change of paradigm is essential. Fundamentally, this requires a shift in societal values and political culture. We need a new reformation, not so much a reformation in certain theological doctrines (although this would help), but rather an *ecological reformation*. Any such reformation must embrace holistic thinking and take systems seriously; it must respect scientific evidence; and it must value stewardship, sustainability, resilience and intergenerational justice.

Is such an ecological reformation possible? Undoubtedly, the challenge is daunting. Changing attitudes, values and behaviours is hard work. There are many barriers, points of resistance, forms of inertia, and types of path dependence. And there are no simple magical solutions or silver bullets.

But major paradigm shifts have occurred in the past in our scientific thinking and other world views (as Thomas Kuhn pointed out in the 1960s), and there is no reason why they should not happen in the future. Fortunately, human beings, despite their cognitive biases, prejudices and petty dogmas, are also reflexive and able to learn. We have imaginations and can exercise foresight.

How might governments generate, or at least contribute to, the required change in mindsets? The Greek philosopher Aristotle emphasized the importance of logos, ethos and pathos – that is, the use of logic and reasoning, an emphasis on ethical norms, and appeals to the emotions or passions. All three are critical; both hearts and the heads matter. In short, political leaders need to make persuasive arguments for a paradigm shift, and related changes in policy and regulatory frameworks. And to do this, they need to make use of all the levers, resources, opportunities and techniques at their disposal. The menu here includes:

1. presenting a powerful, plausible and coherent societal vision, drawing on narratives, framings, and metaphors that resonate in the particular cultural context;
2. highlighting the failures and anomalies of the existing defective paradigm;
3. collaborating with existing ecologically-oriented civil society organizations, but also strategically engaging with progressive forces and change-agents within other sectors of society, including business;
4. building cross-party coalitions;
5. encouraging government departments and agencies to develop new and better analytical approaches that properly integrate and embed future-focused and ecological values;
6. leading by example and providing authentic, ethical leadership – for instance, replacing the Crown vehicle fleet with electric vehicles;
7. changing crucial policy settings, including those likely to generate positive path dependencies that will reinforce the tenets of the new paradigm.

But governments are often laggards rather than leaders. Currently, many members of the National-led government need an ecological reformation in their thinking more than their constituents. What, then, are the options for generating positive societal, policy or governance tipping points when governments are part of the blocking mechanism?

Logically, there are two main solutions: change the government or change the thinking of those in office, especially senior ministers and their most influential advisers. In a democracy, such changes are only possible via argument and persuasion. It requires achieving a critical mass of similarly motivated people, especially those in positions of influence. And this, in turn, requires change agents, policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Huitema and Meijerink, 2010), campaigns, social movements, coalitions, networks, and a particular kind of values-based politics (see Harris, 2017). And all this requires an immense amount of effort, dedication and perseverance.

Thankfully, the shift in world views towards one that is ecologically aware is gathering momentum, both globally and locally. But the necessary tipping point has yet to be reached, at least locally. An ecological reformation is coming, but outdated and misguided thinking remains entrenched in significant parts of our society and political system. I fear this will continue for many more years, with tragic consequences.

Conclusions

Tipping points matter. They constitute critically important and often disruptive phenomena. They occur in a diverse range of systems and settings, not least ecological and political ones. And they can have serious, large-scale and irreversible consequences. They thus deserve our serious and abiding attention.

Good anticipatory governance is vital in this context for at least two reasons: first, to enhance the capacity of governments to foresee and mitigate negative tipping points; and second, to alert governments and their citizens to the potential for positive tipping points, especially those designed to safeguard our vital long-term interests.

Currently, the dominant policy paradigm, certainly here in New Zealand, is seriously deficient. It is based on flawed philosophical presuppositions, questionable empirical assumptions and dubious ethical priorities. It also manifests a marked presentist bias, with damaging environmental implications. It will not safeguard the collective goods that are essential for a secure and prosperous future. On the contrary, the current paradigm poses a major threat to our collective intergenerational wellbeing.

We urgently need a better paradigm, one that accepts the reality of non-negotiable biophysical limits and properly values biodiversity and ecosystem services. Very simply, a transformative ecological reformation is required – a collective *re-form-ation*. Such a reformation must embrace not only our hearts and minds, but also our national governance institutions and policy frameworks. Such societal transformations are possible, but securing the necessary tipping points in public attitudes and values will not be easy. We must use all the available leverage points in our democratic system, seeking, wherever possible, to enhance the anticipatory capacity of our political institutions. Much is at stake. Time is not on our side.

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